STRUCTURAL DYNAMIC OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: BETWEEN HIERARCHIES, MARKET AND NETWORK FORMS by Lumini?a Gabriela POPESCU
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT  17/2011 
Structural Dynamic of the Public Sector and Multilevel Governance:  








Structural Dynamic of the Public Sector and Multilevel 
Governance: Between Hierarchies,  






  Abstract: In the current economic, social and political context, the problem of 
the competitiveness reform in public sector lies in the assumption of strategic approaches 
focused on meeting the public interest, with the lowest cost   for society. 
The philosophy management which governs public sector reform tends to create 
new paradigms and contributes   to shaping a new way of thinking and behavior. 
Central idea of this paper is that the two dominant models of administration: bureaucracy 
and governance, provides a range of institutional opportunities but also raises a number of 
barriers to strategic approaches to emerging public sector.  
Bureaucracy is for example, criticized because the lack of prioritization skills and 
lack of goals and also because lacks to stimulate innovation in the public sector. 
Bureaucracy leads to uniformity, flattening of public services. Governance model 
contains a number of similarities with the strategic approach in the public sector, when we 
talk about networks, interdependence and self-organizing nature of public administration. 
The  issue  that  we  are  trying  reveal  to  your  attention  is  that  the  current  institutional 
conditions are more complex than two models mentioned are able to cover.  
These  new  demands  require  the  types  of  organizational  structures  based  on 
flexible, decentralized structure to replace the traditional centralized, which now is totally 
inapplicable. Institutional framework may, for example, to provide an opportunity for the 
New Public Management, but also create a barrier to governance 
 
Keywords:  bureaucracy,  governance,  public  policy,  networks,  multilevel 
governance. 
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  Introduction  
 
For more than two decades there has been a concern about the reformation 
of the public sector. Thus a series of models have been created but it is rather 
difficult to state which one of them is the best. In certain European countries there 
are expectations towards the re-modeling of the state. In others, the reform implied 
great changes focused on the improvement of performance in the Public sector. But 
                                                            
1 Associate Professor PhD, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest; 
Romania, email: luminitapopescu@snspa.ro  
 ADMINISTRAŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  17/2011 
Structural Dynamic of the Public Sector and Multilevel Governance:  






what is really important is that in every European country the model of change in 
the public sector is taken into discussion very seriously. 
There  is  a  series  of  questions  that  emerge  in  this  circumstance:  Why? 
Which are the forces that induce so vigorously the need for change in this sector? 
How  can  similarities  be  explained?  What  about  the  differences  between  the 
European countries? 
The central position of the model of change is taken by decision-making 
process of the elite. This placement is not accidental because most of the specialists 
in  change  agree  that  it  is  the  result  of  a  top-down  approach,  i.e.  it  requires 
acknowledgement and total commitment of the political decision-making factors 
(executive managers and high-ranked clerks). 
The change is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the existing 
political  administrative  system  which  superimpose  on  those  of  the  change 
management process.  
These systems are the ones which define the framework of the change and 
in which one must take into account the different context variables, fact which 
exceeds the approaches focused only on some instrumental features of the change 
(the systems of total quality, budget oriented towards results, performance contract 
and other similar instruments can prove to be inefficient or even in appropriate). 
In these cases the attention is prevalently paid to a variable or to another 
one, instead of a serious analysis of the variations in the context of the intervention. 
 
1. Between hierarchy and market 
 
The theory of the public sector activity is integrated in two complementary 
logics, on the one hand the theory of organizations, and on the other hand the logic 
of the general theory of action. 
The  activity  in  this  sector  must  be  understood  first  as  a  result  of  the 
functioning as an organization or as a body of organizations. Thus, it appears from 
a very well defined way of analysis, organizational sociology, which developed 
rapidly in the „50s and was expressed in many published scientific works. 
The understanding of the public administration as an organization deeply 
changed  the  representations  which  existed  up  to  that  moment  and  allowed  the 
usage of new theoretical instruments. 
From this point of view, G. Timsit summarized the contributions of the 
organizational  analysis  in  La  science  administrative  d‟hier  á  demain  et  après 
demain as follows: 
o  from the point of view of an instrumental public sector obeying totally 
the  political  power,  the  administrative  organizations  seem  to  be  actors  with  a 
certain harmony; 
o  the separation between administration and civic society is also under 
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o  the  relations  between  organization  and  external  environment  are 
fundamental to the configuration and its balance; 
o  the unitary and hierarchical character of the administration is replaced 
by organizational networks with their own logic and objectives. 
Thus, as G. Timsit  stated (Timsit, 1986), the image of an administration 
split between contrary rationales becomes obvious. 
The idea of an action system was subsequently developed by Crozier and 
Friedberg  (Crozier  and  Friedberg,  1977) through  the  passing  to  the  collocation 
organization of the system. The authors define the action system as „the structured 
human assembly which coordinates the actions of its participants through relatively 
stable game mechanisms and which maintains its structure, i.e. the stability of the 
games and their reports through adjustment mechanisms which are actually other 
games‟. 
The issue of the action systems is a generalization in the terms of the open 
system and beyond the formal organization of the organizational problem. Crosier 
and Friedberg (Crosier and Friedberg, 1977) assert that organizations place at the 
end of a continuum of material action systems with a high degree of formalization, 
structuring  of  the  participants‟  consciousness  and  human  responsibility  openly 
assumed, and the adjustment method can vary from the unconscious adjustment of 
the action system to the conscious adjustment of a perfectly rational organization. 
M. Massenet (Massenet, 1975) said the present structural system has as 
main objective ‚ the transformation of  the formal traditional structure which is 
hierarchical, rigid, inefficient and expensive into a complex of agents which are 
designated in a specific field to optimize the results of the public results. 
This reformation of the public sector raises few interesting issues in the 
economic analysis: What type of economic institutions, competitive devices and 
hierarchical ones can be considered able to configure an efficient framework of 
leading  the  transactions  in  this  sector?  (Coase,  1988;  Williamson,  1996,  2000, 
2002).  
And by extending the analysis field, are the failures in the public sector 
more  obvious  in  the  case  of  some  unitary  institutional  arrangements  or  some 
combinations of competitive and administrative mechanisms? From the perspective 
of  these  issues,  the  new  institutional  economy  offers  an  analytical  framework 
different and complementary at the same time, from the standard economic theory 
(E. Brousseau & J.-M. Glachant 2002). 
Ronald  Coase  (Ronald  Coase,  1937),  one  of  the  pioneers  of  the 
comparative  analysis  of  the  economic  institution,  defined  the  fundamental 
difference  between  markets  and  hierarchies  and  stated  that  certain  decisions of 
resources allotments were made within hierarchical organizations due to the need 
for the reduction of the transaction costs. 
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase recognized that the market is not the only 
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comparing  transaction  costs  on  the  market  with  the  cost  of  internalizing 
transactions within firms in order to evaluate the relative efficiency of these two 
alternative methods of economic coordination.  
Thus, it is no surprise that, Coase rejected the fundamental proposition of 
the  new  welfare  economics,  that  nationalizing  monopolistic  industries  and 
subjecting these nationalized firms to the marginal pricing rule is the basis of all 
rational public policy. 
Notably, Coase suggested that this path solves the problem without having 
studied it, since it assumes that any public authority has complete and costless 
access  to  all  information  concerning  consumers‟  preferences  and  available 
technologies  and  resources,  and  does  so  without  causing  any  variation  in  the 
underlying data and behaviors. This assumption seemed completely unrealistic to 
Coase,  to  whom  the  recommendations  of  welfare  economics  became  blind 
“blackboard economics.” 
F. Fukuyama (2004) considers this theory perfectly applicable to the public 
sector, but only to the economic fields that belong to this sector. For the remaining 
public  activities  „the  black  box‟  can  be  assimilated  with  „a  black  hole‟  in  F. 
Fukuyama‟s opinion. 
In  The  Problem  of  Social  Costs,  Coase  (Coase,  1960)  re-examined  the 
analysis of economic interactions when the price mechanism is inoperative (i.e. 
externalities  management),  and  showed  that  public  regulation  is  not  better  in 
principle  than  private  negotiation  for  dealing  with  market  failure.  Naturally, 
transaction costs exist between private agents in reality (costs which depend on the 
existing system of property rights and laws, in particular), but there are also costs 
associated with resorting to public intervention.  
Thus,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  the  costs  associated  with  these  two 
solutions, public and private, on an equal footing. Moreover, even from a purely 
theoretical  perspective,  new  welfare  economics  is  false.  Assuming  that  all 
transaction costs are nil, public intervention is not necessarily preferable to direct 
private arrangements between economic agents for managing market failure: In the 
absence of transaction costs, negotiating and implementing private arrangements 
between agents would be entirely free, by assumption. 
Coase‟s  hierarchy  system  implies  an  objective  unity  resulted  from  the 
authority relations. On contrary, Alchian & Demsetz (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) 
said that there is nothing unique in the authority relations to differentiate them from 
the  voluntary  relations  between  the  participants  on  the  market.  Williamson 
established a theory in which alternative economic institutions frame transactions 
and  he  himself  suggests  an  application  to  the  deregulation  of  public  sector 
(Williamson, 1976, 1985). 
Williamson‟s starting point in 1976 is the same as that of Goldberg and 
Demsetz‟s: Can the competitive mechanism replace ex post oversight by public 
regulatory authorities in the whole public sector? Williamson accepts Demsetz‟s ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT  17/2011 
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original premise: The existence of natural monopolies does not inevitably imply 
that permanent public regulatory agencies are required. 
However Williamson associates the need for a public regulatory body with 
difficulties associated with contracting for the rendered service.  
These difficulties, he maintains, are caused by the use of specific assets 
that bind the two partners, seller and buyer, to each other, while the existence of a 
degree of complexity in the service makes it impossible for them to negotiate a 
complete contract ex ante. It follows that the incompleteness of any contract drawn 
up  ex  ante,  combined  with  the  disappearance  of  competitive  pressure  after  the 
contract has been awarder under franchise bidding, voids any credible guarantee of 
appropriate performance of the service contract. 
In this case, the credible guarantee of performance of the contract is not 
found upstream of the service contract, in incentives introduced ex ante, but rather 
downstream of the service contract, in its ex post governance structure (especially 
in the decision-making powers given to the public regulatory agency). 
This  is  why  Williamson  (Williamson,  1985)  distinguishes  between  two 
types  of  public  sector  reform.  One  type  is  applicable  to  industries  in  which 
competitive mechanisms introduced ex ante are sufficient to frame the transactions 
because the assets used are not very specific and the threat of competition remains 
credible ex post. 
A second type of reform covers industries into which the introduction of 
competitive mechanisms ex ante must be combined with ex post intervention by a 
public regulatory body, for reasons that are symmetrically converse to the former 
(presence of asset specificity, and thus little ex post credibility of the contractual 
incentives specificity.) 
Malone, Yates et.al (Malone, Yates et al, 1989) developing Coase‟s theory 
of transaction costs and hierarchy, have speculated that at the same time with the 
appearance of cheap information technology the transaction costs will decrease, 
and the hierarchies will concede more and more space to markets or to some more 
decentralized  organizational  forms  where  the  participant  entities  are  not  in  a 
hierarchical  relationship.  By  creating  lower  transaction  costs,  the  information 
technology  provided  many  firms  with  the  theoretical justification  to  flatten  the 
managerial  hierarchies,  to  use  external  sources  and  to  „virtualized‟  structures  
(F. Fukuyama, 2004). 
In conclusion, the new technologies stress the requests for such structures 
in the public sector, this passing being unconceivable with the hierarchical and 
rigid  structures  which  slow  down  the  informational  flow  whenever  it  needs  to 
speed  up.  In  the  bureaucratic  hierarchy,  activities  take  place  according  to  the 
general rules and norms. 
The main objective of the structures and the instruments of managerial 
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system,  the  improvement  of  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  processes 
implies some legislative modifications. 
The creation of some flexible structures adapted to the present dynamic 
and tumultuous environment imposes acceptance of a higher degree of decision 
decentralization. 
The key feature of a market is that it claims to be a mechanism that secures 
economic activities and the coordination of the economic activities without any 
conscious organizing centre that directs it. It is based upon decentralized decision 
making, involving a competitive process between dispersed economic agents who 
make  their  decisions  according  to  the  price  mechanism  and  well  demarcated 
contractual  arrangements.  So,  it  is  an  information  gathering  and  dissemination 
process based upon prices, where no single agent controls things, but which arrives 
at  an  ex  post  optimum  outcome  that  best  satisfies  social  needs  and  maximizes 
social  welfare.  These,  at  least,  are  strong  claims  made  for  this  mechanism 
(Thomson, 2003). 
The  establishment  of  a  configuration  appropriate  to  the  centralization  / 
decentralization  proportion  is  still  a  challenge  for  the  public  sector. 
Decentralization  is  not  a  real  objective  and,  therefore,  a  comparative  analysis 
between  the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of  the  centralized  activities  and 
those of the decentralized ones is necessary (Androniceanu, 2010).  
There are circumstances where the principle of maximum decentralization 
proves  to  be  especially  productive.  Experience  demonstrates  that  this  is  when 
processes  and  activities  are  completely  standardized  and  the  decision  is 
decentralized down to „the lowest operational level‟. 
The most complex situations are those in which the existence of a vertical 
connection between the brain in the centre and the body in the territory is vital to 
avoid the paralysis of the situation through analysis. In this case decentralization is 
necessary, but it must be based on several reconsiderations of the way it is defined, 
decentralization is not the process of lowering the decision-making level, but rather 
the process of responsibility distribution between the different managerial levels of 
the public administration. 
The principle of maximum decentralization is replaced by the principle of 
strategic visibility: for each major decision, the authority/responsibility must be 
placed  at  the  lowest  level  where  all  variables  relevant  to  the  decision-making 
process are visible (Popescu, L.G., 2005). 
The  need  for  continuous  connections  between  brain  and  body  has 
fundamental structural implications: closely knit inter-functional cooperation for 
political implementation, configuration of the strategic capacity and development 
of the powers able to answer the challenges associated to the development process 
of a public policy. 
One of the variables that must be taken into account when an analysis of 
the  proportion  centralization/decentralization  is  done  expresses  the  degree  the ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT  17/2011 
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government is involved in maintaining the uniformity of the services at a national 
level. 
From  the  managerial  perspective,  D.  Osborn  and  Gebbler  (Osborn  and 
Gebbler, 1992) developed the concept of „reinvention or restarting of governing‟ 
according to which the transformation of the public sector into an innovative form 
is  possible  through  the  adjustment  of  a  series  of  principles  specific  to  the 
competitive mechanisms: 
  empowerment of citizens by transferring the control from bureaucracy 
to community; 
  promotion  of  competition  between  providers  of  public  and  private 
services; 
  subordination of rules and regulations to the respective mission; 
  evaluation of performance according to successes / failures and not to 
the used resources; 
  main concern for satisfying the needs of the community; 
  giving up the re-active behavior for a pro-active approach to prevent 
potential problems; 
  focus on earnings and not expenses, thus following the private model; 
  decentralization  and encouragement of the participant management. 
From  the  perspective  of  „reinvention  of  governing‟,  the  association  of 
network structures to the governing systems, following the general model of inter-
organizational networks, has become a major reflection theme. 
 
2. Networks as organizational forms 
 
Networks have proved a useful alternative conception in analyzing how a 
range social activity is organized and governed at a number of levels. They arise 
spontaneously, so to speak, or by deliberative design, but they are not coordinated 
solely by the price mechanism according to the dictates of purely competitive and 
commercial  criteria,  not  solely  by  consciously  designed  administrative  or 
management structure. 
At first the concept of organization in a network was known to refer to the 
professional  institutions  and  associations.  The  existence  of  personal  networks 
developed inside and outside organizations proves its utility in the provision of 
information, assertion and progress of carrier, but also in the achievement of other 
personal objectives. 
Most of these types of network are informal. Inside an organization these 
networks  define  the  so-called  informal  organization.  Even  in  the  case  of  the 
strongest bureaucracy, there is a conflict between the formal organization and the 
informal one. Nevertheless, it is a known fact that organizations could not function 
without the informal networks.  ADMINISTRAŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  17/2011 
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Moreover, for the executive management the existence of a strong informal 
network represents am advantage in promoting the strategic decisions, on condition 
that the network leaders support these decisions. At the company level, business is 
conducted through networks, providers and customers being part of them. 
Traditionally, these relations based on a high level of trust and cooperation, 
so  more  on  informal  relations  and  less  on  legal  formalities.  The  intensive 
competition  was  the  essential  factor  in  determining  the  company‟s  focus  on 
earnings based on the increase in the number of providers and the competition 
between them. In this context the relations between different points in the value 
chain tend be become conflicts, thus a legislative framework being necessary in 
order to regularize the relations between them. 
Despite these  challenges, there  are enough  examples  of companies  that 
develop  partnership  relations  with  providers  and  succeed  in  improving 
performance along the value chain. Networks operating in these areas are neither 
organized  like  a  market,  nor  are  they  officially  sanctioned  in  the  form  of  a 
hierarchically regulated structure. 
In  the  last  decade  of  the  last  century,  the  network  structure  was  also 
promoted at the level of governing systems as an opportunity to involve „the voice 
of collectivity‟ but also other entities participants in the process of elaboration of 
the compartmental public policies, as F. Fukuyama stated (Fukuyama, 2004). 
The network structure was defined by R.E. Milles and C.C. Snow as „a 
bunch‟ of organizations, specialized or individual entities coordinated by market 
mechanisms rather than by those of a command chain. 
In H. Brahami‟s opinion the network structure represents „a federation or 
constellation of business entities which are usually interdependent connected by 
know-how and with individual relations with the centre‟. The author considers the 
role of the centre the one of a conductor whose strategic vision ensures both the 
common  administrative  and  organizational  „infrastructure‟  and  the  unity  of  the 
mission and the objective. Each entity can be considered the centre of its own 
network. 
The model of the network structure is completely different from the one of 
the bureaucratic-democratic organization in which the power source is unique, the 
principles  of  the  hierarchy  of  functions  and  different  authority  levels  imply  a 
methodical system of domination and subordination and in which there is a strict 
supervision from the superiors (Androniceanu, 2008).  
Thus, to assume the objectives of the society, the bureaucratic structure 
must divide into distinct units between which there are „connections of mutual and 
continuous  dependence  which  allow  the  appearance  of  an  alternative  to  the 
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3. Governing systems structured in a network 
 
The  transformation  of  the  traditional  hierarchy  into  a  network  structure 
leads to the creation of some common places to express the problems and look for 
solutions and where a variety of ideas can be expressed. In these „real battle fields‟ 
a  sufficient  number  of  actors  are  involved,  each  one  representing  different 
objectives, visions and interests. The degree of attendance and action methods of 
every actor participant in the network is different.  
Thus, compared to the unitary organizations or the classical hierarchies, 
these structures are characterized by flexibility. 
A more elaborated and largely accepted definition of the concept is the one 
expressed by Hufen and Ringeling (1990). They consider the network-structured 
systems  as  being  social  systems  where  characters  develop  interaction  and 
communication models that present a certain continuance and are oriented towards 
political issues and programmes. Briefly, these systems represent real „governing 
structures‟. The development of an efficient system of communication between the 
groups that compose the network leads to a potential gain for the governing act, 
materialized not necessarily in „to do more‟, but rather in the ability to master the 
challenges of a complex and dynamic environment. 
The informational flow between the elements of the network is vital for the 
effectiveness  of  the  strategic  directions,  and  the  informational  systems  are 
considered  the  main  assets  of  the  network.  The  electronic  communication  and 
reduction  of  the  costs  for  the  remote  communication  make  possible  the  quick 
dialogue  within  the  network,  in  every  direction  and  the  facility  of  sending 
messages from every location to all members of the network.  Thus, the premises 
of  the  interaction  between  all  the  actors  of  the  network  are  created.  This 
opportunity comes closer to reality due to the entities of the network that manifest 
firmly towards autonomy. 
Gradually, even though once the network centre held supremacy, it can no 
longer  totally  control  the  entities  of  the  network.  In  these  circumstances 
governance has a larger meaning being all the network actors‟ political effort to 
cooperate, unlike the traditional model in which governance is considered the main 
character.  This  fact  points  out  the  debate  on  the  position  of  the  central 
administration and the other actors of the network.  
Similar to organizations, the political systems in network can be seen as 
mixed structures of vertical and horizontal interdependence. The expansion of the 
role of other actors participants in the network does not imply the reduction of the 
role of the administration, but the development of some supplementary decision-
making forms as a reply to the increase in complexity and interdependence. In this 
context,  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  political  decision  receives  extremely 
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The  decision-making  process  follows  a  model  of  communication, 
accession, coordination, negotiation, compromise, exchange, delegation and leaves 
the  decision-making  to  the  groups  involved.  As  a  result,  these  governmental 
processes are more vague, abstract and complicated; and somehow less efficient 
than in the case of the traditional hierarchical governance.  
In conclusion, as Melisseu emphasized, governance must be interpreted as 
a system of processes within which the government plays an important but variable 
part next to many other actors (Melisseu, 1993). 
The  most  modern  approaches  conceptualize  the  expression  and 
implementation  of  the  policies  as  interactive  processes  with  many  characters, 
whose development and finality can be understood only through those characters‟ 
information  and  power.  The  systemic  approach  of  the  concept  of  departmental 
public policy is appropriate with the mentioning that there are a few additional 
observations.  
A first observation from the perspective of the network system would be 
the one that the characters interact not only during the examined process, but also 
before and after the finalizing of the departmental public policy. 
A second observation refers to the fact that the characters interact not only 
in the examined process, but in other fields, as well. The acknowledgement of the 
fact that the examined process is not the only stage where the interaction between 
the  characters  develops,  even  only  for  the  period  of  the  study;  facilitates  the 
understanding of the connections between the activities and interactions that take 
place in the examined process and are induced to other interdependence processes 
by experience. 
A third observation is that from the perspective of the network structured 
system,  the  characters  involved  in  the  process  under  examination  are  also 
influenced by secondary characters that do not play a direct role in the studied 
interaction,  but  are  connected  to  the  network.  One  can  conclude  that  some 
organizations in a network political system will always play a secondary part which 
is not void of importance, being the source of indirect influences on the other 
entities in the network. 
An  advantage  of  the  network  system  is  that  it  can  be  used  to  direct 
attention  towards  a  larger  interdependent  structure.  Instead  of  assuming  that 
influences  manifest  through  direct  and  visible  interactions  (such  as  personal 
relationships, relations between the representatives of the institutional interests), 
the approach through the network structure facilitates the examination of the way 
an  enlarged  structure  has  effects  on  the  individual  characters‟  behavior,  the 
contents  of  the  decisions  and  the  efforts  to  implement  the  departmental  public 
policies.  
Altogether, these observations explain why the development and the result 
of  a  departmental  policy  differ  from  the  predicted  process  as  result  of  the 
interactions between the characters. The characteristics of the network structure of 
the governing systems are the ones talked about in the following line. ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT  17/2011 
Structural Dynamic of the Public Sector and Multilevel Governance:  







Multi-form is the basic characteristic of the network structure, being the 
expression of involvement of a rather large number of characters, each of them 
having their own purposes, visions and interests. It is important to remember that 
these  characters‟  participation  differs  in  uniformity,  varying  at  the  changes  of 
environment according to each one‟s receptivity level.  
The consequence of this characteristic is that the actors‟ sensitivity levels 
regarding the normative signs can differ very much. Each of the actors will react to 
the best at a certain „signal‟. The network structure of the administrative systems 
includes both people and institutions. Some actors are involved individually, but 
others  are  representatives  of  other  systems  and  professional  groups.  Thus,  the 
multi-form  character  of  the  system  is  partially  determined  by  the  fact  that  the 
participant actors differ as type, level of conglomeration and representative base.  
Moreover,  this  characteristic  is  also  given  by  the  more  or  less  distinct 
configuration of purposes, visions, interests and resources, which is specific to each 
character  of  the  network.  Isolation  is  the  second  characteristic  of  the  network 
structure. The actors in a network have a certain autonomy which leads to a relative 
isolation from the environment they act in.  
Each actor has his own reference system and reacts only to signals that are 
in resonance with this system. In other words, the participants in the network are 
prevalently interested in their own interests, but also in those of the participants 
whose reference systems are compatible with theirs. In these circumstances, an 
actor in the network will give up isolation and cooperate only if it considers that 
the political instruments used match its reference system. In case norms at the basis 
of the legislative and regulation instruments are not seen as accordingly to its own 
norms, their usage will prove to be inefficient and ineffective.  
The third characteristic is the interdependence between the elements of any 
network.  This  is  expressed  through  several  variables:  financial,  competence, 
political support, space, etc. It is understood that it refers to the reasons for which a 
lot of characters take part in the elaboration of policies.  
Generally, the configuration of the network structure is decided according 
to the principle that every participant enriches the capacity of the political process 
with resources, know-how, activities and that without this attendance the political 
process  would  be  less  functional  as  regarding  its  legitimacy,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness. Interdependence must be seen as a result of the composition of two 
vectors. The first vector is represented by the actors of the network that control the 
resources and the instruments of the power, relevant to the achievement of the 
goals. 
The second vector is defined by the positive or negative effects on the 
actors of the network, in case one of them succeeds in achieving its goals. This 
means  that,  to  achieve  their  own  goals,  the  participants  in  the  network  must 
cooperate  and  negotiate.  Thus,  interdependence  refers  to  the  relations  between ADMINISTRAŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  17/2011 
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different groups of interests, and so they are oriented towards the development and 
control of the power relations. (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). 
 
4. The network structures and the multi-level governance 
 
Compared to the traditional governance forms, the participation of several 
interdependent characters generates especially complex models due to the nature of 
the existing relations and interactions. 
The functions of the governance network differ from those of other types 
of network. In the networks created by companies, the dominant functions are the 
transactional and co operational ones. The processes of elaboration of the network 
policies support the processes of exchange and cooperation at the operational level. 
In these cases, the emphasis on the horizontal interdependence is stronger than in 
the administrative vision. As opposed to the previously presented situation, the 
political networks are oriented towards coordination and regulation. 
By  coordination  we  mean  that  elements  in  the  system  are  somehow 
brought into an alignment, considered and made to act together, and by governance 
we mean the regulation of these elements: the effectiveness of their reproduction, 
of their alignment and coordination. (G. Thomson, 2003). 
But it must be noticed that not all the actors in the governance network 
have the same orientations. Most of the time problems are neither uniform, nor 
well defined; and the participants‟ points of view referring to the optimal solution 
can be in a conflict. Even when the coordination and the regulation functions are in 
the foreground negotiation is necessary. 
Generally, it can be stated that there are enough convergent interests to 
make possible the achievement of a network synergy or of a situation of the type 
‟gain-gain‟. This means that there can always be tensions between the functions of 
the system as a whole and the functions it has for each actor participant in the 
network. 
As  long  as  the  governmental  roles  are  associated  with  some  collective 
goals, the relation between the vertical and the horizontal interdependence will be 
an important tension zone. 
In  conclusion,  as  the  basic  functions  of  all  types  of  network  refer  to 
dependence  and  interdependence,  an  important  function  of  theirs  is  the  power 
regulation or control (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). 
Networks are systems built to coordinate contributions, regulate behavior 
and distribute costs  and benefits. They are also structures used by entities in the 
network to maintain the mutual control on the actions and on the decision-making 
processes within the network. 
This difference in functions assumes that in the political systems structured 
in this way, governance is associated to the coordination, regulation, distribution 
and control processes. 
In  the  governing  processes  cooperation  and  conflict  are  almost 
simultaneous. Thus, the concept of governance, as it is associated to the network ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT  17/2011 
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political  systems,  is  much  more  complex  than  in  the  case  of  the  traditional 
bureaucratic  model.  Coordination  and  regulation  are  still  relevant,  but  they  are 
completed with functions that regard the distribution of costs and benefits, and the 
regulation  of  the  power  processes.  Essentially,  it  means  that  the  democratic 
political  system  gives  part  of  its  political  functions  to  other  institutions  in  the 
society.  
Recently, the concept of networks of public policies is more and more 
closely  linked  to  the  political  governance.  This  is  the  concept  of  multi-level 
governance which refers to the particular issue of the coordination of the activities 
on  different  governing  levels.  So  it  involves  the  relations  between  the  local, 
regional,  national  and  European  authorities.  In  the  absence  of  a  hegemonic 
imposing  mechanism,  this  implies  abilities  to  negotiate  between  different  parts 
situated on different levels, similarly to the model of the public policies networks.  
These types of administrative arrangements are visible in certain aspects of 
the decision-making systems at different levels, thus resulting: 
a) The horizontal coordination of policies at the local, regional, national 
and European level. It is achieved through bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations 
about  issues  such  as  pollution,  economic  integration.  The  main  feature  of  the 
relations built through the horizontal coordination of policies is determined by the 
fact that it operates in the social environment and outside the direct control of the 
states. 
The  contemporary  society  proves  a  special  permeability  in front  of  the 
forces  from  the  local,  national  and  transnational  levels:  flows  of  goods,  ideas, 
knowledge, people, capitals, services, values, movements and even social problems 
cross easily the national territorial borders. 
In the present situation the need for this type of institutions created on the 
horizontal and which pass the borders of the nation state in their activities, occurs 
prevalently in the following fields: 
  environment.  The  major  threat  to  the  environment  is  not  the  local 
pollution, but the alteration of the environment on which the life on Earth depends 
(atmosphere, rainforests, oceans, water sources). This type of challenge can not be 
overcome within the borders of the nation state because pollution does not know 
any boundaries. 
  eradication of terrorism. For the last decades the actions to eliminate 
terrorism have become more and more important. This is very dangerous because 
very  small  groups  can  keep  under  threat  the  entire  democratic  world. 
Consequently, great common efforts must be made at the global level to face these 
violent threats. 
  weapon control. Closely related to the eradication of the terrorism, there 
is the necessity of the transnational weapon control. 
  human  rights.  The  American  president  Jimmy  Carter  advocated  the 
creation of a transnational agency to protect human rights. The efficiency of such a ADMINISTRAŢIE ŞI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC  17/2011 
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transnational organization is questionable because methods this agency can use to 
stop the human rights violations in the non-democratic regimes. 
b) The vertical coordination of policies which requires the same behavioral 
pattern,  but  now  with  reference  to  the  organization  of  relations  between  these 
administrative  levels.  In  Henry  Bull‟s  opinion  (1977)  the  responsibility  for  the 
increase in the interaction degree that has been noticed in the European political 
systems, large enough to be talked about, belongs to the expansion of system of the 
European states and their transformation into a unique European construction. 
The key concept of the multi-level governance is the relocation of authority 
between  different  levels,  either  from  the  perspective  of  subsidiary  or  of 
decentralization. Both tracks imply the reconfiguration of the existing jurisdictions 
and the creation of some new ones according to the capacity of the authorities. 
This  relocation  of  the  decision-making  jurisdictions  can  lead  to  a  new 
hierarchy rather than to a mutual dependence, asymmetric dependence or relative 
independence, which may be the most representative characteristic of the network 
structure.  In  case  of  a  new  hierarchy,  a  recentralization  that  will  diminish  the 
dynamic of the policy networks pursues the real achievement of results. 
So the power shared by multiple jurisdictions is much more efficient in 
making the decisions regarding public policies because it reflects the heterogeneity 
of preference of different elements at different levels. 
The monopoly on a decision held by a central actor (the state) proves the 
vulnerability of those competitive interests and of the elements, as well. Hooghe 
and  Marks  identify  two  types  of  multi-level  governance:  (Hooghe  and  Marks, 
2001): 
a) The spread of authority to a certain level. It is the option of the semi-
federal system or the type of intergovernmental relations which include networks 
created by the existing direct connections between the departments of different 
national governments and which are not under a complete central control. 
b)  The  multi-centric  option  which  covers  geographical  territories  and 
functional fields. 
The idea at the basis of this option is on the one hand the flexibility and 
spontaneous reply to the changes in the citizens‟ expectations and preferences but 
on the other, receptivity to the functional exigency. The second type is able to 




If one abandons the notion that government steers from an isolated position 
above society that government steers in a mono-centric and mono-rational way 
with a singular, clear objective, then notions on polycentrism and multiform in 
government  arise,  as  well  as  thoughts  on  multiple  and  different  rationales  of 
government actions. ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT  17/2011 
Structural Dynamic of the Public Sector and Multilevel Governance:  







The emergence of a research approach in which governance in complex 
inter-organizational policy networks in the public sector has a central position is 
one  of  the  scientific  results  of  the  debate  on  the  limits  of  governance  for  the 
administrative and policy sciences.  
The starting point of the network approach in administrative science was 
the recognition that the classic form of management, central, top-down steering in a 
hierarchical organization, does not work in a network of more or less independent 
actors. Top-down steering in a network without a top is meaningless, and central 
steering and coordination do not work in a network of more or less autonomous 
actors with different goals, interests and positions. That policy processes in the 
public  sector  indeed  exhibit  network  characteristics  has  been  concluded  in 
numerous analyses and studies subsequent to the 1978 study. Whether it concerns 
intergovernmental,  inter-organizational  or  implementation  networks,  the 
descriptive validity of network approach appeared high but the question of the 
possibilities of network governance remain. How can such a network of more or 
less independent actors be  governed: in way can such self-steering complexity be 
more or less influenced in some intended direction? (Kikert, W.J.M., 1977) 
Three aspects in the governance of complex public sector networks are 
especially important.  
The first aspect is the context, defined as the environment. Second is the 
complexity,  defined  as  the  number  and  variety  of  the  system  elements  and  the 
relations between the system elements.  
The  third  aspect  is  governance,  defined  as  directed  influencing.  
(G. Thomson, 2003) Public management can not be isolated from political and 
societal context, neither generally- the context of political democracy and legal 
state, nor specifically- the context of the specific policy sectors with diversity of 
political, social, public, and private actors.  Management and organization in the 
public  sector  cannot  be  isolated  from  this  context.  Public  management  is  the 
governance in complex policy networks in a specific societal sector. 
In a network of many separate actors, with different and often conflicting 
goals and interests and with diverging power positions, no single dominant actor 
exists.  Such  complexity  means  negotiation  and  implies  a  different  form  of 
governance than mono-centric, mono-rational, hierarchical top-down control by an 
omnipotent government. On the other hand, public governance in complex network 
differs from the polar opposite of hierarchy, total autonomy of actors. Networks are 
characterized by the many dependencies and relationships between actors. 
The distinction between a multi-actor network and completely autonomous 
actors is not without meaning. It means that actors not entirely independent, and it 
also means that although actors are not hierarchically sub-or super-ordinate, they 
are not completely equivalent. Government will always take a different position 
than other societal public and private actors in a policy network.  
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Government can not dominate and unilaterally dictate but nevertheless, it is 
not entirely equivalent to all other actors. This is not a normative statement but an 
empirical observation than the role of government in policy networks is special and 
unlike the roles of many other actors. This does not imply a return to top-down 
control. It does imply that full horizontality and total autonomy of actors is an 
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